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s the second round of the Geneva II talks concluded in failure on February 
15th, the end of the Syrian conflict still seemed a distant goal. Yet, the 
adoption on February 22nd of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2139 
shows there is growing international consensus behind the need for a negotiated 
solution, driven by a global exasperation with the bloody stalemate in Syria. The 
unanimously adopted resolution strongly condemns human rights violations in the 
country, particularly those committed by the Syrian regime, while also condemning 
terrorism. It demands “all parties [to] work towards the comprehensive 
implementation of the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 leading to a genuine 
political transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people and 
enables them independently and democratically to determine their own future”. The 
international community must now work towards the setting up of a ceasefire as a 
precondition to a comprehensive and meaningful intra-Syrian dialogue and final 
agreement premised on constitutional reform. 
The hopes of the European Union and the rest of the international community for a 
diplomatic resolution of the Syrian conflict lie in the negotiations between the Syrian 
Government and the Syrian National Coalition (SNC). The framework of diplomacy 
remains the unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution 2118 of September 2013, which 
combines an endorsement of the 2012 Geneva Communiqué calling for “the 
establishment of a transitional governing body exercising full executive powers, 
which (...) shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent’ in tandem with the laying 
down of a binding framework for the destruction of chemical weapons. As Andrew 
Tabler, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, recently 
argued at an event held at CEPS, it is this dual conditionality in the Russia-US 
sponsored resolution that provides the ‘thin edge of the wedge’ for the international 
community to push for a resolution of the conflict.  
Despite agreeing to a limited truce in Homs to enable evacuations of areas besieged 
for almost two years, fighting continued elsewhere in Syria during the second round 
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of talks between 10th-15th February. The two sides proved unable to bridge their 
differences: while the government insisted that negotiations should focus on 
combating ‘terrorism’, the opposition was adamant on discussing the setting up of a 
transitional government. Crucially, the SNC dropped its previous demands for 
Assad to leave, with their programmatic ‘Statement of Basic Principles’ making no 
mention of him.1 On the other hand, the government seemed unwilling to cede any 
ground. As the talks ended, the two sides had theoretically agreed to a four-point 
agenda for future negotiations: dealing with the violence and terrorism, setting up a 
Transitional Governing Body, starting discussions on national institutions and 
initiating a process of national reconciliation. However, they were unable to agree on 
a procedural approach to future talks, with UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi stating 
that the Syrian government had rejected his suggestion to discuss terrorism on the 
first day and transition on the second, raising suspicions that it did not  want to 
discuss the setting up of a transitional government at all. This suspicion was further 
substantiated by Assad’s claims in an interview with AFP that he would probably 
stand in future Presidential elections and in which he ruled out sharing power with 
the opposition seeking his ouster, as well as the government’s moves to add several 
members of the opposition to a ‘terrorist list’ during the negotiations. Brahimi 
declined to set a date for the resumption of talks, hoping that the two sides would 
take time to reflect. 
Several factors worked to undermine the negotiations in Geneva. Firstly, observers 
agree that while the military situation is very fluid, it does not overtly favour either 
side, which undermines incentives to compromise. Reassertion of government 
control remains improbable in the short term, while infighting within the opposition 
weakens its position. The government, emboldened by the success of averting US 
military strikes over the use of chemical weapons and by continuing Russian and 
Iranian military and political support, may well believe it has nothing to gain by 
‘giving in’, thinking it can prevail in the long-term. Indeed, there are concerns that it 
is failing to live up to its commitments with the Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons regarding the shipment of chemical weapons outside of the 
country. Several key deadlines have already been missed. More worryingly, the 
government recently suggested that it need not destroy 12 chemical weapons 
facilities but simply render them inactive; a measure that would be easily reversible. 
Secondly, in spite of the dual conditionality in UNSCR 2118, there were stark 
differences between ‘Western’ and Russian positions. The two sides agreed on the 
need to end violence, to preserve the unity of Syria and to combat extremism, but 
differed on their approach, with Russia supporting the Syrian government’s 
emphasis on counterterrorism while neglecting to apply pressure on the key issue of 
political transition. Thirdly, the negotiations have been undermined by the limited 
leverage that the West has over many of the factions within the Syrian opposition. In 
fact, one of the surprises of the Geneva II process so far has been that the SNC has 
held together.  
                                                   
1 Syrian Opposition Delegation, Statement of Basic Principles, 9 February 2014 
(www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/02/12/world/middleeast/13syria-statement.html?_r=0).  
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As the spillover from Syria destabilises the entire region, the urgency of reaching an 
inclusive diplomatic solution is growing. The overt differences between the two sides 
in Geneva appear on the surface to be more procedural than structural. Now that the 
SNC has made the very significant concession of envisaging Assad’s presence in a 
transitional government it is time for all other parties to apply strong pressure on the 
Syrian government engage constructively in negotiations.  The unanimous passage of 
UNSC Resolution 2139 marks the growing international momentum behind the 
Geneva process. The resolution strongly condemns all fighting and terrorism, 
demanding the cessation of violence against civilians, the lifting of sieges and 
unfettered access for humanitarian convoys. Further encouraging signs stem from 
the growing links between Russia and the SNC. These developments show 
increasing Russian and Chinese willingness to press the Syrian government, while 
also marking growing readiness by the West to take Moscow’s emphasis on 
terrorism into account. These are welcome signs that the international community as 
a whole is starting to move in a more coordinated manner on the Syrian peace 
process. A key test will be the enforcement of the Resolution, and Russia’s 
willingness to hold the Syrian government to account if it fails to live up to it. 
The growing international consensus on Syria should be brought into play to restart 
the Geneva process, with the aim of negotiating an immediate ceasefire. The US and 
the EU should subordinate the demand for an a priori agreement on a transitional 
governing body to the negotiation of a ceasefire in place. Indeed, it is difficult to 
envisage the government and the SNC agreeing at this stage on the structures of a 
unitary transitional government with a common security apparatus, considering that 
this would be drawn from forces that have been fighting each other for almost three 
years. The Dayton Agreement of 1995, putting an end to the Bosnian Civil War, could 
serve as a prototype, with both sides maintaining their respective security forces 
within the framework of an overarching national government. However, unlike the 
Dayton Agreement, the Syrian agreement would envisage the merging of the two 
entities into a unitary constitutional structure after the cessation of violence and the 
formation of the transitional government. Securing such a ceasefire agreement would 
not only end the violence and enable full humanitarian access; it would also allow 
the SNC to set up more effective governance structures and social services in the 
areas under its control, coalescing into a more cohesive political body. Moreover, in 
accordance with UNSC Resolution 2139, it would allow better targeting of terrorist 
groups that do not want an end to the fighting and that do not share the vision of a 
Syria where all confessional and ethnic groups are safeguarded. A ceasefire is also 
the precondition to the essential process of national dialogue and reconciliation, 
which remains unimaginable as long as the fighting is ongoing. 
Even if the aim of obtaining prior agreement on a transitional government is 
dropped, convincing all stakeholders to agree to a ceasefire will not prove easy. In 
order for agreement to be possible, international pressure on the Syrian government 
should be increased to encourage it to come to the negotiating table. This should be 
done both by applying diplomatic pressure and by working to strengthen the SNC 
and its military forces. The US seems willing to step up its efforts in this regard.2 The 
                                                   
2 “U.S. Scolds Russia as It Weighs Options on Syrian War”, New York Times, 17 February 2014.  
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Council of the EU should follow suit and restate its commitment to full and timely 
implementation of the chemical weapons deal. The EEAS and EU member states 
must work to promote the constructive engagement of key regional actors in the 
diplomatic process. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran, each of which exert great 
influence on the different parties in the conflict, are essential components of a 
comprehensive solution. In particular, Iran’s fullest cooperation will depend on the 
success of the ongoing nuclear negotiations with the E3+3, in which the EU plays a 
pivotal role. Finally, all negotiating parties must work to engage Syrian society 
beyond those currently involved in the negotiations, looking to involve those 
remaining groups of civil society upon which the future of Syria can be rebuilt.  
 
